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ABSTRACT
This research analyzes the results of the Report of the Commission to Assess the
United States National Security Space Management and Organization, dated January 11,
2001 in order to determine which recommendations were beneficial, which
recommendations are still in effect and what additional measures should be undertaken to
continue, and even advance, our standing as a premier space power. It analyzes the
potential managerial and organizational shortcomings of National Security Space within
the United States Government, specifically the Department of Defense. Additionally, this
paper reviews the various management and organizational force restructuring which
occurred as a result of the commission’s report and other recommendations / directives
from the time period. Many dynamics have changed with regard to national security
space in the thirteen years since the commission’s report was released. This paper will
identify the significant effects of these decisions and which mitigating actions should
now be undertaken to offset any unintended consequences and shortfalls. The study will
show the importance of the national security space managerial and organizational
structure in order to validate the essentiality, viability and efficacy of this program. A
literature review of a number of peer-reviewed documents, government / military
archives, interviews and related texts have been researched in an effort to fully vet this
process. This paper provides a sound analysis to ascertain any managerial and
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organizational shortcomings to National Security Space and to recommend possible
restructuring in order to streamline our processes.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This research paper is focused on analyzing the recommendations of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, more commonly known as the 2001 Space Commission Report or, even
more colloquially, the Rumsfeld Report on Space. The commission was directed by
Congress in Public Law 106-65, Section 1623, of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000. The commission members consisted of the Honorable Duane P.
Andrews; Mr. Robert V. Davis; United States Air Force General (Ret) Howell M. Estes,
III; United States Air Force General (Ret) Ronald R. Fogleman; United States Army
Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner; the Honorable William R. Graham; United States Air
Force General (Ret) Charles A. Horner; United States Navy Admiral (Ret) David E.
Jeremiah; United States Air Force General (Ret) Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.; Mr. Douglas
H. Necessary; United States Army General (Ret) Glenn K. Otis; the Honorable Donald H.
Rumsfeld (Chairman); United States Senator (Ret) Malcolm Wallop, R-WY. Many of
the military members were former commanders of North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and the United States Space
Command. Of the civilian appointees, there is a former U.S. Senator, past deputy
director of NASA, professional staff members for the House of Representatives, and a
previous (and future) Secretary of Defense. Some critics have derided the report as being
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too right-wing, alarmist and one-sided; mainly staffed with members of the militaryindustrial complex. Given the commission members’ backgrounds it is easy to make that
allegation, but the overall report seems prudent and worth review.
The Commission met for approximately six months and delivered its report on
January 11, 2001. The Commission interviewed many military, intelligence community,
government and industry leaders in order to ascertain the current state and future of
national security space. This impressive list of interviewees included former
commanders and vice commanders of Air Force Space Command, U.S. Space Command,
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), former directors and deputy
directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Imaging and Mapping
Agency (NIMA; now known as National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA),
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).
As the Commission stated in its Executive Summary, its original charter was to
assess the near-term, mid-term, and long-term changes which should be implemented to
improve the management and organization of national security space. The commission
decided to address just the near and mid-term issues as they believed that long-term
solutions could be better emphasized through Presidential leadership in space policy.
The commission believed that Executive level involvement and focus on the space
enterprise would have more impact on changes to long-term issues. The commission
made ten specific unanimous recommendations for improvements in National Security
Space and advocated that they be taken as a whole. (pgs 31-35 EXSUM). Further, the
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Commission identified five unanimous conclusions which encapsulated the ten
recommendations for additional emphasis. (pgs 99-100 Commission Report)
The United States Government has divided space into four categories or sectors:
Civil, Commercial, Military and Intelligence. NASA, along with NOAA and USGS,
handle the preponderance of the civil sector and there has developed a plethora of
commercial companies over the years which have been eager to pursue commercial space
interests. That leaves the two remaining areas of space, military and intelligence. These
two areas have been grouped together as “national security space” over the years and
leads to a foundational question, “What exactly is National Security Space?” It has come
to represent the collaborative efforts between the Department of Defense and Intelligence
Community with regard to space. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3100.10
defines national security space as, “The space-related systems, services, capabilities, and
associated information networks of the Department of Defense and the national
intelligence community, or other space-related systems that the Secretary of Defense may
designate as national security space systems in coordination with the system owner, that
support U.S. national security and enable defense and intelligence operations during
times of peace, crisis, or conflict.” Gaining an understanding of national security space
is imperative to determining what it encompasses, how it came to be, how it is presently
structured and how it might be improved.
The term, national security, is relatively straightforward and alludes to protecting
the security of our nation and its citizens. Protecting, or securing, national interests so
that our nation has the freedom to operate as it deems necessary is essential to its status
and to its sovereignty. There are numerous areas that affect our national security; from
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access to energy and natural resources, to access to domestic and international commerce,
to military superiority (or at least parity), to environmental stability to, in more recent
times, cyber-security. The space domain is not unlike the other media of land, sea and
air; accordingly it has evolved over the last seventy years to become an area that greatly
influences and enhances our national security. Department of Defense Joint Publication
1 defines national power as having four elements; diplomatic, information, military and
economic (DIME). Many elements of national power would suffer greatly without
unfettered access to space. Simply put, National Security Space is the securing, and / or
protecting, our access to and maneuverability in space in order to carry out our national
interests.
Purpose for Research
It would seem obvious that National Security Space has become a vital aspect of
daily life and our national interests. For over 60 years, every President from Eisenhower
to Obama has discussed the importance of space and the need for a coherent space policy.
Each administration issues directives, guidance, visions and policies about space. While
much of the presidential policies and guidance advocate the correct emphasis and
priority, there has been little follow up or progress made at the senior government levels.
As Roger Launius noted in his book, “Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential
Leadership”, the mere fact that a president advocates for a more robust space policy,
space exploration, space deterrence, or space synchronization doesn’t guarantee that the
space enterprise will receive any additional emphasis or achieve more notable goals.
This can be for a variety of conflicting reasons from economic to political to international
concerns. Internally though, the U.S. Government should position and structure National
4

Security Space to take full advantage of the space medium to avoid a “Space Pearl
Harbor” as the Commission warned against in its Report. This is the main emphasis of
this research; to examine the findings of the Space Commission, determine which
recommendations / conclusions were enacted, and what may be done to improve the
current management and organization of National Security Space.
Statement of the Problem
Is the current managerial and organizational structure of National Security Space
conducive to effective space operations and does it provide a means to deter / defeat
potential space adversaries? I would submit that it does not, but there have been huge
strides within the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community and the senior
levels of U.S. Government. Lieutenant General J. Kevin McLaughlin, USAF, states it
well in the title of his article in the US Air Force journal, High Frontier. His article is
titled, “The Space Commission: 10 Years Later, But Not Quite 10 Years Closer”. As a
Lieutenant Colonel at the time, now Lt Gen McLaughlin actually served as a staff
member for the Commission and is able to provide some unique analysis. While there
has been much good work within the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community, the Space Commission’s recommendations were not “taken as a whole” and
there has been no major restructuring efforts at the senior U.S. Government levels which
would make it more conducive to achieve the Commission’s recommendations.
This sentiment is reiterated in another article in the same journal. US Air Force
General (Ret) Howell M. Estes, III titled his article, “The Space Commission: 10 Years
Later – Still a Work in Progress”. It seems to be a common agreement that we have
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achieved impressive accomplishments within National Security Space management and
organization, but that we are not operating at the optimal level.
Therefore, I plan to focus on the Commission’s recommendations and conclusions
to determine which actions were implemented, did they have the desired effect and what
actions remain to ensure that the U.S. is able to remain a leading space power and able to
maintain a viable National Security Space Strategy.
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CHAPTER II
AN ANALYSIS
OF THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
The primary document to review in the research for this paper is the actual
Commission’s Report. In the following sections I will systematically outline the Report’s
Charter, Scope, Organization, Recommendation, and Conclusions. I will also analyze the
“Implementation Guidance” signed by Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Rumsfeld of
which recommendations he endorsed to be implemented from the Commission’s Report.
Interspersed throughout my analysis will be commentary from other sources which may
amplify, verify or contradict statements from the Commission’s Report and the
SECDEF’s Guidance.
The Commission’s Charter
Originally, the commission was tasked to assess the near-term, mid-term, and
long-term changes which should be implemented to improve the management and
organization of national security space. The commission decided to just address the near
and mid-term issues as they believed that long-term solutions could be better emphasized
through Presidential leadership in space policy. The commission believed that Executive
level involvement and focus on the space enterprise would have more impact on changes
to long-term issues.
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The commission was directed to look at the “potential costs and benefits” of
creating a separate military department (a space corps) or merely carve out a separate
corps within the Air Force specifically to address national security space missions.
Additionally, it was to look at the possibility of establishing an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space as the point man for corralling national security space issues. From a
financial perspective, the commission was directed to examine establishing a “major
force program”, an accounting classification, which would enable the U.S. government to
better manage how much was being spent on space missions and to whom the money was
going.
The Commission’s Scope
The commission used the space missions and functions contained in the 1996
National Space Policy which included an incredible variety of agencies and organizations
who had an “interest” in space activities. (Figure 1) The sheer magnitude of agencies
which affect space activities is daunting and overwhelming as evidenced in the preceding
figure. In order to narrow the focus of the report the commission decided to just consider
the space assets pertaining to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence
Community (IC), in other words, “national security space”. The Commission did
consider the civil and commercial space sectors, but only as they influenced DoD and IC
space activities.
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9
Source: Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization

Figure 1. U.S Government organizations currently involved in space activities

Organization of the Commission’s Report
As stated in the Commission’s Report it was organized in the following five sections:
The role for space in future national security affairs and the challenges the U.S. is
likely to confront to its commercial, civil, defense and intelligence interests
Objectives for advancing U.S. interests in space by enabling and encouraging
development of policies, personnel, technologies and operations essential to
maintaining U.S. leadership
U.S. agencies involved in national security space as a basis for understanding
current practices and identifying alternative approaches to organization and
management
Current management of space activity at the national level, within the Department
of Defense and within the Intelligence Community
Recommendations for organization and management, including specific proposals
to address discrete issues and problems identified in the course of the
Commission’s deliberations
Commission’s Ten Recommendations
As previously discussed, the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization, as established by Public Law 165-05
which was the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, released its
report on January 11, 2001. The Commission unanimously cited ten recommendations
and highlighted five conclusions and suggested that they be “taken as a whole”. In other
words, the commission’s recommendations were interconnected and dependent on each
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other. Breaking up the recommendations would not have the same effect, or achieve the
same results, as they would when enacted in their entirety. The Commission’s ten
recommendations were as cited below:
1. Presidential Leadership – “The President should consider establishing space as
a national security priority.” Each president since Eisenhower has had a distinct interest
in this new medium of space; each attaching varying degrees of importance and
criticality, but only recently has it evolved to become a top national security priority. In
fact, the term “national security space” did not appear in National Space Policy
documents until President Reagan’s 1988 version. It may have appeared ten years earlier
in President Carter’s PD/NSC-37, but the document is difficult to decipher due to it being
the heavily redacted copy available to the public.
2. Presidential Space Advisory Group – “The President should consider the
appointment of a Presidential Space Advisory Group to provide independent advice on
developing and employing new space capabilities.”
3. Senior Interagency Group for Space – “The President should direct that a
Senior Interagency Group for Space be established and staffed within the National
Security Council structure.” Recommendations Two and Three point to the
Commission’s evaluation of the current (as of the Fiscal Year 2000 timeframe) national
security space organization and management structure, especially at the senior levels.
Figure 2 displays how the National Security Space enterprise was structured in FY 2000
and Figure 3 shows some recommendations from the Commission of how to improve its
processes at the senior levels of government.
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Figure 3: A New Organizational Approach for Space
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Figure 3 diagrams the Commission’s recommendation of how the National Security
Space enterprise be organized. Some of these recommendations are discussed in more
detail in the following paragraphs.
4. SECDEF/DCI (now DNI) Relationship – “The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence (now the Director of National Intelligence) should meet
regularly to address national security space policy, objectives and issues.” This has been
an evolving relationship fraught with strong personalities, opposing agendas, secrecy and
bureaucratic hurdles. Ten years later a benchmark document emerged when they both
signed the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper outlined in this document the
Strategic Space Environment and Objectives; identifying five key strategic approaches
(peaceful use of space, improved capabilities, partnering, deterring aggression, defeating
attacks / operating in a degraded environment).
5. Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence and Information – “An
Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence and Information should be
established.” See Figure 3 in the middle of the chart. This position would be within the
Secretary of Defense sphere, at the Under Secretary level, and not answerable to the
Secretary of the Air Force.
6. Commander in Chief of the U.S. Space Command and NORAD and
Commander, Air Force Space Command
a.) “The Secretary of the Air Force should assign responsibility for the
command of Air Force Space Command to a four-star officer other than
CINCSPACE/ CINCNORAD.” (‘CINC’ or ‘Commander in Chief’ is an out-of-
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date term. The new, correct title is Combatant Commander of a Combatant
Command (COCOM). ‘CINCSPACE’ referred to ‘Commander in Chief of U.S.
Space Command’. U.S. Space Command, as a COCOM organization was
dissolved in 2002 and its responsibilities were folded under STRATCOM
(Strategic Command) and AFSPC (Air Force Space Command).
b.) “The Secretary of Defense should end the practice of assigning only
Air Force flight-rated officers to the position of CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD
to ensure that an officer from any Service with an understanding of combat and
space could be assigned to this position.”
7. Military Services
a.) “The Air Force should realign headquarters and field commands to
more effectively organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained space
operations. Assign Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) responsibility for
providing the resources to execute space research, development, acquisition and
operations, under the command of a four-star general. The Army and Navy
would still establish requirements and develop and deploy space systems unique
to each Service.”
b.) “Amend Title 10 U.S.C. to assign the Air Force responsibility to
organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air and
space operations. In addition, the Secretary of Defense should designate the Air
Force as Executive Agent for Space within the Department of Defense.” Title 10
of the United States Code (U.S.C.) is the document which authorizes military
forces and outlines their responsibilities. This recommendation is further
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discussed later in the section on Department of Defense Directives (DoDD),
specifically DoDD 5101.02, DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Space, dated January
25, 2013.
8. Aligning Air Force and NRO Space Programs – “Assign the Under Secretary
of the Air force as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO).
Designate the Under Secretary as the Air Force Acquisition Executive for Space.” This
is depicted in Figure 3 as a realignment from the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(ASAF) to the Under Secretary of the Air Force and dual-hatted as the DNRO. This is
discussed further in the SECDEF Implementation Guidance section.
9. Innovative Research and Development – SECDEF and DCI (now DNI) should
direct the creation of a research, development and demonstration organization to focus on
this requirement.
10. Budgeting for Space – “[E]stablish a Major Force Program (MFP) for
Space.” This MFP is an accounting tool to assist in the tracking of space related funding.
MFP 12 was created in 2008 by Congressional direction and is managed by the Defense
Department.
The Commission’s Five Conclusions
The Commission identified “five matters of key importance for senior leaders of
the U.S. Government”. Essentially, these five matters of key importance are, in effect,
their five Conclusions. They are as stated below:
1. Presidential Leadership – “the rapid pace at which this dependence [on space]
is increasing and the vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. national security
space interests be recognized as a top national security priority” “Only Presidential
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leadership can ensure the cooperation needed from all space sectors – commercial, civil,
defense and intelligence”.
2. The U.S. Government, especially DoD and the IC needs to restructure. “[A]
number of disparate space activities should promptly be merged, chains of command
adjusted, lines of communication opened and policies modified to achieve greater
responsibility and accountability.” Military space forces are better organized under
STRATCOM (JFCC-Space) and achieve a measure of “jointness”, but each service still
maintains their own space forces.
3. The SECDEF and the DCI (now DNI) need to agree on space priorities and
cooperate to make them happen. “They must work closely and effectively together, in
partnership, both to set and maintain the course for national security space programs and
to resolve the differences that arise between their respective bureaucracies.” Finally
formalized, in writing if not in practice, was the 2011 National Security Space Strategy
signed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper. This strategy outlined the Strategic Environment and Objectives. It identified
five key strategic approaches (peaceful use of space, improved capabilities, partnering,
deterring aggression, defeating attacks and operating in a degraded environment).
4. Develop superior space capabilities. Space will see conflict as has every other
medium. “[T]he U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile
acts in and from space.”
5. Invest more in science and technology to include facilities and people. “The
U.S. Government needs to play an active, deliberate role in expanding and deepening the
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pool of military and civilian talent in science, engineering and systems operations that the
nation will need.”
Implementation Guidance
The Chairman of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, Donald Rumsfeld, removed himself as the
chairman shortly before the Commission released its Report due to the fact that President
George W. Bush had selected him as his Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Nine months
later on 18 October 2001 the SECDEF issued his Implementation Guidance. Secretary
Rumsfeld stated that he “agreed with the Commission’s conclusion that a new and
comprehensive approach to national security space management and organization is
needed to promote and protect the nation’s interests in space.” (SECDEF Memo dtd 18
October 2001) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD (ATL)) was tasked with ensuring the implementation of his guidance and
reporting back to the SECDEF periodically. The eight points of his Guidance was
directed to specific Secretaries, Under Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Agencies, or Services under his control to implement his directions. This information
may seem a bit redundant, but it is worth examining in detail. Outlined is the SECDEF
Implementation Guidance:

1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD (ATL)) was directed to complete four sub-directives:
a. Issue a policy memorandum delegating Milestone Decision Authority
to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), who may further redelegate to the
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Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) for space Major Defense Acquisition
Programs.
b. Make the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) military positions
Joint Duty Assignments. The intent here seems to be to make this office more
“joint” and spanning across each of the services in order to provide a more
inclusive view of the space domain throughout the Defense Department and the
Intelligence Community.
c. Direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force (USecAF) and the Director
of the National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) to conduct a comprehensive
assessment, in coordination with other Military Services and other U.S.
Government agencies, of the technology required for access to and operations in
space. The USecAF/DNRO should also direct the Director of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to begin research and
development into those technologies. Of note here, and to be discussed more
later, is that the USecAF/DNRO position was to have been a dual-hatted position
in order to bridge the divide between the Air Force and the NRO thus reducing
redundancies and creating efficiencies for space programs. Although there had
been six instances of this dual-hatted “ness” between the Air Force and the NRO
before this time period, the only one afterwards was Peter B. Teets. Soon
thereafter the position split again when it was discovered that the respective
agencies’ mission sets and priorities were quite different and unique.
d. Have the USecAF and the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Office
(BMDO) prepare a memorandum defining their authorities and relationship with
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each other with regards to space and space-related systems currently under the
management of the BMDO. This agency has since become the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA).
2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R))
was directed to complete two sub-directives:
a. Ensure effective sourcing of a four-star billet for the Commander of Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC).
b. Prepare a memorandum for the President to approve the SECDEF’s
appointment of the USecAF as the DNRO.
3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) was directed to
complete six sub-directives:
a. “[U]pdate of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.1,
‘Responsibilities and Functions of the DoD Components’ … “to assign the [U.S.]
Air Force [the] responsibility to organize, train, and equip for prompt and
sustained offensive and defensive air and space operations and clarify the other
Service’s unique space responsibilities and functions.”
b. Prepare a DoD Directive to “designate the Department of the Air Force
as the Executive Agent for Space… with Department-wide responsibility for
planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems.” DoD initially issued
DoDD 5101.01, DoD Executive Agent (EA), dated 3 September 2002 to
designate the duties and responsibilities of an EA. Later, the Department issued
DoDD 5101.02, DoD Executive Agent for Space, dated 3 June 2003. This
Directive was recently updated 25 January 2013 under the same title. The latter
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document specified the duties and responsibilities of the Defense Space Council
(DSC) and the SECAF / USecAF responsibilities as the EA for Space.
c. Prepare a memorandum of understanding between the SECDEF and the
DCI to “realign the NSSA [National Security Space Architect] under the
USecAF-DNRO”. This was seen as a way to possibly streamline the space
enterprise and designate one person as the responsible entity. However, this
position ceased to exist in 2004. DoD then established the National Security
Space Office (NSSO) which combined the offices of the NSSA and the National
Security Space Integration (NSSI) office. However, this office was disestablished
in 2010. This duties and responsibilities of this office now reside as a joint office
under the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Space. LtGen Ellen Pawlikowski is the
current Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, and is dual hatted as the military lead for the DoD EA for Space.
d. “[P]repare a policy… for establishing a mechanism to coordinate the
Department’s positions on space… at deliberations of the National Security
Council’s Policy Coordinating Committee for Space.” The Defense Space
Council now appears to be performing this function.
e. “Develop a plan… to propose to our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies the establishment of a planning group… for the
purpose of consulting on the formulation of alliance policy and plans regarding
space activities.”
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f. “Review… and… revise the Department’s polices regarding the use of
commercial space products, goods, and services in support of Department of
Defense missions.”
4. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller / Chief Financial Officer was
directed to complete three sub-directives:
a. “Establish… a ‘virtual’ space program, budget, and accounting
mechanism… to increase visibility into the resources allocated for space
activities.” A virtual Major Force Program (MFP) for Space was established and
it is still in use to this day. The virtual MFP assists in the tracking of space
related spending by the DoD and IC.
b. “Promulgate planning, programming, and budgeting guidance
documents… for the DoD Space Program.”
c. Direct the “USecAF-DNRO to submit… an annual National Security
Space Program Assessment to the Senior Executive Committee (SEC).” This
SEC was “comprised of the SecDef, the DepSecDef, the USD (AT&L) and the
Service Secretaries.” There was an additional report that Secretary Rumsfeld
directed be submitted to himself and the DCI, or the “Executive Committee”.
5. The CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was directed to “promulgate
guidance, in coordination with the Commander in Chief of U.S. Joint Forces Command
(CINCJFCOM) and CINCSPACE, directing CINCJFCOM to establish a Space
applications Experimentation Cell at JFCOM.”
6. The Secretaries of the Military Services were directed to complete these three
sub-directives:
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a. “[Develop and maintain]… a cadre of space-qualified professionals
comprised of military and civilian personnel in sufficient quantities to represent
their Military Department’s and DoD agency’s best interests in space
requirements, acquisition, and operations.”
b. “[A]ssure space education, including Professional Military Education
(PME), at all levels to ensure the cadre of space-qualified professionals… have a
direct understanding of space activities and how space capabilities and
applications are integrated into military operations… [especially] combat
operations”. The military has improved in education and training of space
professionals. Most of the services send students to the National Security Space
Institute (NSSI) in Colorado Springs, CO for junior, middle and senior levels
training courses.
c. “Maintain a sufficient cadre of space-qualified professionals… within
each of their Military Departments to assure that each Service retains the ability to
develop, plan, program, and acquire space systems uniquely required by
individual Service missions.” Through personnel management systems, each
service is able to maintain an adequate number of space professionals. However,
they are often not promoted at the same frequency as other specialties or
branches.
7. The Secretary of the Air Force was directed to complete the following nine
sub-directives:
a. “Assign responsibility for the Command of Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) to a four-star officer other than CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD.” The
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caution here is to NOT dual-hat this position. General John E. Hyten is the
current AFSPC Commander. He is responsible for “organizing, equipping, train
and maintaining mission-ready space and cyberforces.” However, only USAF
space forces directly; he is not responsible for those same duties for the US Army
or Navy. And, although he is a four-star General officer, he is not a COCOM
commander. He does exercise some control over the joint space professionals
assigned to JFCC-Space (14th Air Force) and Patrick Air Force Base, FL (45th
Space Wing) since those organizations are subordinate units under his command.
b. “Realign headquarters and field commands… to more effectively
organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space
operations.” This realignment of units dealt specifically with reassigning the
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) from Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), assigning the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) for Space directly to the Under Secretary of the Air
Force and making that position dual-hatted as the SMC Commander. Additional
implementation directions under this section involved “[d]isestablish[ing] the
position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space once a USecAF has
been confirmed” and giving the AFSPC Commander the ability to “program
funds and direct research and development within the Air Force laboratory
system.”
c. “Assign the Commander of AFSPC appropriate responsibility within
the Department of the Air Force for managing the space career field.”
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d. “Prepare and present… a space career management plan… [which] will
address space career management, accession, education and training
requirements, and investments needed for advanced technical degrees.” This plan
was to include “career path advancement… [which included] research,
development, acquisition, and operations… [in order to give a] greater depth and
breadth of experience in the space career field.”
e. “Assign the USecAF as the Air Force Acquisition Executive for
Space”. This was designed to give the Air Force as the EA for Space a better
grasp of fiscal expenditures (and the ability to allocate or not) which were
occurring in the DoD under the guise of “space”.
8. The USecAF-DNRO was directed to “develop a process to align Air Force and
NRO programs and permit both organizations to use each other’s ‘best practices’ for
space research, development, acquisition, and operations.” As stated earlier, this dualhatting of the USecAF-DNRO had occurred six times in the last few decades. However,
Peter B. Teets was the only person to hold these two positions after the enactment of this
implementation guidance. It was soon discovered that “one person doing both jobs was
overwhelming to the detriment of both the Air Force and the NRO… [and as] a result, in
2005 the positions were separated” as described by General M. Howell Estes, III in his
High Frontier article. (High Frontier, 2011). The Commission sought to merge some of
the best practices of both organizations in combining “White and Black” Space efforts.
Although they do serve some of the same customers, meshing the two space programs
did not, in all ways, provide the best solution for both organizations.
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Some of the Commission’s Recommendations and Conclusions, along with
Secretary Rumsfeld’s Implementing Guidance, have stood the test of time and are still in
effect thirteen years later. There is still the “virtual” Major Force Program (MFP) for
Space which assists in tracking budgetary matters and the United States Air Force is still
the DoD Executive Agent for Space. The Commander for Air Force Space Command,
currently General John E. Hyten, is still a four-star billet and it is no longer double or
triple hatted as the NORAD or USSPACECOM Commander. This prudent decision
allows the AFSPC Commander to devote more of his time to purely space related
matters. The USAF has mostly ended the practice of assigning flight-rated officers to
command AFSPC since 2002. All, with the exception of General Kevin P. Chilton (in
command from 2006 – 2007), have been ICBM and Space professionals.
There does appear to be better coordination and collaboration between the
SECDEF and the DNI as evidenced by both signing the 2011 National Security Space
Strategy. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter did publish a memorandum on 22
November 2011 defining in more detail the operation of the Defense Space Council
(DSC). He stated that the DSC “shall serve as the principle advisory forum to inform,
coordinate, and resolve all DoD space issues.” This watershed document will garner
more detailed examination later. Subjectively, there have been better Presidential
National Space Policy’s issued of late, but they are not specific enough and fail to
provide clear direction.
On the negative side, there were other recommendations, conclusions and
guidance which are no longer in effect. Notable among those is that the USecAF and the
DRNO position is no longer a dual-hatted position. This was a critical recommendation
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as it was intended to bridge the gap between DoD and IC space programs. Not having
this central point of contact for these two space programs “continues to feed a
dysfunctional NSS.” (Estes, High Frontier, 2011). Also missing are the commands of
USSPACECOM and JFCOM. These commands were specifically mentioned in
Secretary Rumsfeld’s Implementing Guidance. When the new Unified Command Plan
was reorganized in 2002 and 2011, these commands were disestablished and their duties /
responsibilities absorbed by other COCOMs, namely STRATCOM and NORTHCOM.
These COCOM consolidations were mostly beneficial and have assisted DoD in
streamlining its force structure, mission alignments and fiscal priorities. More discussion
will follow near the end of this research paper of a necessity to re-establish / reorganize
USSPACECOM as a sub-unified command under STRATCOM in much the same
manner that USCYBERCOM is currently structured. This will add the needed emphasis
and structure to maintaining a high degree of National Security Space.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
I reviewed many government documents, reports, memoranda, military
professional journals, online articles, books and even conducted an interview with Mr.
Richard McKinney, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space and Director,
Executive Agent for Space Staff, while researching material for this paper. All were
extremely useful and provided much background and a variety of viewpoints about this
very important aspect of national security.
Justification for Research
There has been a significant amount of research and study conducted about the
Space Commission Report, its recommendations, conclusions and implementing
guidance. The overall management and organization of U.S. National Security Space is
not where it needs to be and there is still much that needs to be accomplished.
I initially attempted to research the national security space of other nations, but
decided to focus solely on United States National Security Space. I had originally
postulated that it might be good to compare how another country conducts its national
security space to see if there are lessons learned which may be useful to the U.S. As I
analyzed the Space Commission’s Report I determined that this is a problem set that is
unique to the U.S. Other nations manage their space enterprises differently; many relying
on the commercial or civil sectors of space entirely. Additionally, nations like Russia and

27

China, who are engaged in military space programs are not transparent with their space
programs, especially as they influence national security space.
Additionally, the manner in which our nation governs itself is different from other
nations. Our governmental processes are subject to a measure of scrutiny. Comparing
our national security space management and organizational procedures with those of
Russia or China; our closest near peer national security space competitors, is not realistic.
Their government agencies and procedures are not subject to the same level of public
oversight.
DoD Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, states the following when
analyzing how other nations conduct space operations. “For most other nations, the
civilian and commercial segments dominate space operations. Therefore, civilian space
agencies have often taken the leadership role for space. Agencies such as the European
Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, France’s Centre National
d’Estudes Spatiales, and the Indian Space Research Organization often issue national
policies and strategies in which military space operations may not be addressed. There
are allied space operations centers, such as the European Union Satellite Centre, the
British National Space Centre, and several others, but they are not typically part of
military forces. However, there may be agreements and procedures in place for them to
support military operations.” (JP 3-14, pg. IV-18) As evidenced above, many other
nations do not incorporate a military aspect in their space programs and are mainly
interested in the scientific / Earth monitoring applications. These nations tend to rely on
commercial space-based assets or dual use spacecraft.
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A History of United States
National Security Space Management and Organization
I have already detailed in the previous sections that my primary source document
was the Commission’s Report itself. Another important document for contextual and
historical purposes was “A History of United States National Security Space
Management and Organization” by Joshua Boehm, Stanley Chan and Mel Sakazaki of
System Planning Corporation and Craig Baker from the Space Commission Staff. This
document was produced for the Commission’s benefit and proved invaluable as it traced
military space history from the end of World War II to the present (the year 2000 at that
point). It was of great assistance in understanding the evolution of military and
intelligence space programs and how we arrived at the current management and
organization structure. In Section II it discussed the RAND Corporation’s space
feasibility study conducted on behalf of the U.S. Army Air Forces in 1946 and then how
each service had initiated their own space programs by the early 1950’s. As “Congress
passed the National Security Act of 1947, the DoD assigned responsibility for all spacerelated activities to the Research and Development Board’s Committee on Guided
Missiles, an entity jointly run by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy.” The National
Security Act of 1947 was also the act which created the U.S. Air Force, the CIA, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This paper then sequentially walked
through the U.S. Air Force and the CIA beginning the WS-119L and then the WS-117L
satellite reconnaissance programs. Also outlined in those early days of military and
intelligence space programs it notes the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy programs, the impact
of the 1957 International Geophysical Year (IGY), and the launch of Sputnik.
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This document then shows the evolution of specific agencies and directorates
which were created from the late 1950’s through the 1980’s to manage this new medium;
namely the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), the Office of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)).
The author traces the history of each military services’ space programs; how the
Army and the Navy developed very specific applications to meet their space mission sets
and how the Air Force, teaming with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), became
the primary owner of military space programs.
In the next section the author discusses the Intelligence Community (IC) and their
involvement in space systems. He highlights the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
The last section outlines the various space systems applications that have become
essential to our national security over the past years. The systems included the Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS), Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP), Defense Support Program (DSP), and Global Positioning System (GPS).
Again, this document was invaluable; providing structure to keep these historical events
in proper contextual and chronological format.
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Leadership, Management and Organization for National Security Space
This 2008 assessment was a companion guide to 2001 Space Commission Report
and was conducted by the Institute of Defense Analyses. Its subtitle is a “Report to
Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
National Security Space”. The committee was smaller, but its members were as equally
august as the Space Commission. It was chaired by Mr A. Thomas Young and its
members were Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, USA (Ret); Vice Admiral Lyle
Bien, USN (Ret); General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF (Ret); Mr. Keith Hall; General
Lester Lyles, USAF (Ret); and Dr. Hans Mark. Similar to the 2001 Space Commission
its members brought vast knowledge and experience from various senior level positions
at NASA, NRO, OSD, DoD military services, and commercial industry. Comparing the
similarities and differences between the reports is quite interesting. They also examined
the 2001 Space Commission Report; noting which recommendations were enacted and
which were not. This panel had four major recommendations:
1. The President should and lead the execution of a National Space Strategy
2. Establish a National Security Space Authority (NSSA)
3. Create a National Security Space Organization (NSSO)
4. Change personnel management policies for space acquisition professionals in
order to retain technically competent and experienced professionals.
This latter report has a more concise recommendations format and in conclusion it
states that a “major top-to-bottom overhaul is needed to restore the vitality of National
Security Space, and regain and sustain the competitive advantages afforded the United
States by our space programs”. (IDA, pg ES-6). These recommendations, with the
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associated figures, will be reviewed more in detail in the last section of this research
paper as a “way ahead” to restructure National Security Space.
Professional Journals
Other sources of great assistance were past editions of Aerospace Power Journal
and High Frontier; along with current issues of Air and Space Power Journal and the
National Security Space Institute (NSSI) Space Weekly. High Frontier journal, no longer
in print, was billed as “The Journal for Space and Cyber Professionals” and was
published by Air Force Space Command. Its last edition in 2011 was actually dedicated
to an in depth look at the 2001 Space Commission Report and provided highly useful
insight. Several articles from this edition will be discussed later. Currently, one of the
most purely space professional journal is the NSSI Space Weekly, “a compilation of
published items and commentary concerning significant defense-related issues for space
professionals.” It is distributed by The Air University and compiled by the NSSI
Resource Center. I obtained many great viewpoints from this publication also.
Air and Space Power Journal
Many noted professionals have commented over the years about the importance of
space and where it belongs in the discussion of national security in various issues of Air
and Space Power Journal (ASPJ). This US Air Force journal is dedicated to mainly air,
space and cyber professionals and has evolved over the years since its inception in 1947.
It has also been known by many different titles; Air University Quarterly Review, Air
University Review, Airpower Journal, Aerospace Power Journal and now by its current
title. Its byline is “To Fly, Fight and Win… In Air, Space and Cyberspace”. It addresses
a number of topics, to include Space, that are important to the military community as a
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whole and provides great insight from many respected professionals. Specifically in the
2006 edition of Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ) there were a number of interesting
articles. Of note is the one by Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Harter, USAF, found in the
Summer 2006 ASPJ; in which he lists some Space Power considerations. His article was
titled Ten Propositions Regarding Space Power – The Dawn of a Space Force. He
advanced that:
1. Space is the ultimate high ground.
2. Space is a distinct medium; space forces require space-focused theory, doctrine,
and policy.
3. Space power is a force multiplier for every combatant commander and military
service.
4. Space forces can support all levels of war simultaneously.
5. Space power leverages a nation’s economic and military centers of gravity.
6. Space superiority starts with assured access to space.
7. Controlling space requires eyes, ears, shields, and swords.
8. Space forces require centralized command and control led by space professionals.
9. Space power is a function of a nation’s total space capability (space unity of
effort).
10. National space power reaches its full potential when a nation commits to a
separate, independent space force
Lt Col Harter analyzes each of these ten propositions in detail and then concludes that a
separate space force is not a question of if, but when. His arguments are sound; citing
that space is a “unique, distinct, war-fighting medium… [and that] the true potential of a
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nation’s military space power will come to fruition only when a separate space force is
created.” (Harter, ASPJ 2006) I agree wholeheartedly with his assessment.
High Frontier Journal
The last edition of High Frontier was published in August 2011. Fittingly, it
devoted the entire issue to a review of the 2001 Space Commission Report. Many of the
original Commission members submitted articles reviewing what had been recommended
and what still needed to be done. General William L. Shelton, AFSPC Commander,
introduced the edition. Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Honorable Stephen Cambone,
General Howell M. Estes, Mr. Richard W. McKinney, and Brig Gen J. Kevin
McLaughlin all provided valuable insight as either Commission members or on the
supporting staff; and now with a decade of reflection were able to offer unique
perspectives.
Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Cambone co-authored the first article, Enduring Issues, in
which they re-iterated some of the Commission’s concerns; namely Vulnerability,
Presidential Leadership and a Space Service. They state that the possibility of a “Space
Pearl Harbor” still exists and that the recent events of ASAT tests and cyber attacks
highlight how vulnerable some of our space assets are. Another interesting reflection in
this article is the explanation of why the USECAF and the DNRO was not dual-hatted.
Reorganization efforts within the USAF and the creation of the DNI negated some of the
attractiveness of this recommendation.
General Estes’ article, The Space Commission: 10 Years Later – Still a Work in
Progress, concentrated on three of the Commission’s recommendations: Military
Services; Aligning USAF and NRO Space Programs; and a Separate Commander in
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Chief of USSPACECOM and NORAD; from the Commander of AFSPC. Under the
Military Services Recommendation, he reminisces that the topic of a separate Space
Force was “hotly debated” and opines that the Commission got it correct in leaving Air
Force Space within the USAF. He also believes that the realignment of Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) under AFSPC was the right decision; assisting in the
streamlining and accountability of the space acquisition process. Of the last
recommendation that General Estes examined, Separating CINCSPACE and the
Commander of AFSPC, he concludes that making the AFSPC Commander a four-star
billet to focus solely on space related matters was definitely the right decision. He cites
his personal example of being overtasked as the triple-hatted Commander of AFSPC,
NORAD, and USSPACECOM. However, General Estes believes that the
disestablishment of USSPACOM as a COCOM was absolutely the wrong decision. He
estimates that this is too much for the Commander of STRATCOM to effectively handle.
Of note, this sentiment was echoed by Mr. Richard McKinney, Deputy Under Secretary
of the Air Force for Space and Director, Executive Agent for Space Staff, during my
interview with him.
Brigadier General J. Kevin McLaughling, USAF, was a staff member for the 2001
Space Commission and authored the article, The Space Commission: 10 Years Later, But
Not Quite 10 Years Closer. Brig Gen McLaughlin agrees with the two previous articles
that the “commission’s recommendations have been implemented in a way that moved
the entire program forward… [h]owever, we have much more work to do to ensure the
US NSS program remains not only preeminent, but highly relevant over the long term”.
(McLaughlin, High Frontier, 2011). I concur with his assessment that the Space
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Commission “got most of it right” but that since the recommendations were
complementary and not “taken as a whole [that this has] undermined the overall
effectiveness of those recommendations that were implemented.” (McLaughlin, High
Frontier, 2011). He cites that since the key position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Space, Intelligence and Information (USD/SII) was not created and it left the Space
enterprise under-represented. There is no single senior official within “OSD with both
the clear responsibility, focused staff, and authority to work with the Air Force to assist in
the implementation of recommendations in a manner consistent with the spirit and intent
of the commission’s report.” (McLaughlin, High Frontier, 2011). There is the EA for
Space office and staff, but this is at the SECAF level and not OSD. Brig Gen
McLaughlin also recommends additional authorities be given to STRATCOM, especially
space acquisition related, and more Joint force structure reorganization.
Another important article in this edition is Getting There From Here: Realizing
the Space Commission’s Vision 10 Years Later, by authors Colonel C. David Arnold and
Dr. Peter L. Hays. Their two main concerns centered on Improving Strategic-Level NSS
Management and Organization and also on Improving NSS Personnel Structure. Col
Arnold and Dr. Hays stressed that there is a pressing need for senior level military space
personnel continuity and a clear, concise and persistent NSS vision. Only then will the
national security space enterprise be able to achieve the long term goals which are
required to ensure that the US maintains its space superiority. They assert that once we
have continuous, competent space leadership with a precise, consistent vision statement,
then the organizational and management changes will remain in place and achieve the
recommended goals. “Since the Space Commission, turmoil in the NSS enterprise has
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been compounded because so many NSS management and organizational changes have
been implemented, undone, or modified in such a short span of time, the effects of
previous changes were not always clear before the next ones were initiated. Since it can
easily be 30 years or more from the time a new space system is planned until the last
satellites are decommissioned, the only approaches to improving space management and
organization that make sense require patience, transparency, consistency, and
accountability.” (Arnold and Hays, High Frontier, Aug 2011)

The Torchbearer Report
The US Air Force is not the only military service with an interest in space. The
Navy and the Army have valid requirements to conduct space operations. The US Army
has nearly 300 space operations officers on Active Duty and another nearly 200 in the
Reserve Component. Admittedly, the US Army focuses more of its space priorities on
the operational and tactical levels as opposed to the strategic. The Army concentrates on
providing space capabilities down to the land warfighter requirements. This interesting
article gives some unique perspectives to important priorities and direction for Army
Space Operations and Policy. These remarks were given by General Gordon R. Sullivan,
(USA - Ret) in the article Army Space Capabilities: Enabling the Force of Decisive
Action found in the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Torchbearer Issue
from May 2012.
Gen Sullivan notes that the 2009 Army Space Policy “follows implemented DoD
space policies and procedures, reestablishes objectives for Army space and sustains the
Army Space Council—an advisory committee that provides advice on space issues to the
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Vice Chief of Staff.” This statement is interesting since it shows how the Army outlines
its own policies and procedures, albeit in line with DoD and vets them through the Army
Space Council before submitting to the Vice Chief of Staff. That would be the Army
Vice Chief (currently General Daniel B. Allyn) and a position which Gen Sullivan had
occupied from 1990- - 1991. This process would be well in advance of sending these
Army recommendations to the Defense Space Council and the EA for Space. The 2009
Army Space Policy outlined the following four space-related objectives:
1. Maximize the effectiveness of current space capabilities in support of
operational and tactical land warfighting needs
2. Influence the design, development, acquisition and concepts of operation of
future space systems that enable and enhance current and future land forces
3. Advance the development and effective use of responsive, timely and assured
joint interoperable space capabilities
4. Seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities into the operating force.
The article continues with a description of the 2011 Army Strategic Space Plan
and shows how it was developed to support the focus of the 2010 National Space Policy
and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. “The essence of the [Army] space
strategy is to assure access to resilient and relevant space capabilities that aid Army
forces in unified land operations.” The Army Space Strategy joins with the national and
DoD space policy and strategy in order to “inform the planning, programming, budgeting
and execution process and to address the DoD Directive 5101.2 requirement directing
heads of DoD components to submit space requirements to the DoD executive agent for
space.” (Sullivan, Torchbearer Report, 2012).
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Joint Publications
The Department of Defense, and each of its services (Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marines), publishes an enormous quantity of regulations, policies, procedures, manuals,
instructions, and directives. From a review of DoD Joint Publications, it is clear that the
space sector is important to military operations. Military personnel are tasked with the
protection of commercial SATCOM, GPS and many other systems as a result.
The military services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) currently conduct
operations in the space environment as noted in their joint publications. As an example,
Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, updated on 29 May 2013, states that “[This]
Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of
combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components
of these commands, and the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as
such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander,
exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.” (JP 3-14, pg. i)
In Chapter III of JP 3-14, Command and Control of Space Forces, it states that the
“CDRUSSTRATCOM (Commander of United States Strategic Command) advocates,
plans, and executes military space operations and has the responsibility to prioritize, deconflict, integrate, and synchronize military space operations for current and planned
joint operations… [and he administers] the United Command Plan (UCP)-assigned role
to conduct space operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM has designated the CDR, Joint
Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) to manage day-to-day space
operations.” (JP 3-14, pg. III-1) The Commander of the 14th Air Force is dual-hatted as
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the Commander of JFCC Space. Lieutenant General John W. Raymond is the current
14th Air Force Commander.
As noted previously, the Department of Defense now recognizes five mediums of
operations; land, sea, air, space and cyber. As evidence that space is defined as a separate
medium, one can look to Joint Publication 3-14 which recognizes the unique environment
in which space operates. As defined in DoD Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations,
“Space is a unique environment in which to conduct military operations. Commanders in
all disciplines should have a basic awareness of the fundamental advantages and
disadvantages offered by space operations in order to effectively employ space
capabilities”.
JP 3-14 continues as it defines the characteristics of Space. It shows to the layman
that Space has no geographical boundaries as the other mediums of land, sea and air. It
cites that “[i]nternational law does not extend a nation’s territorial sovereignty up to
Earth orbit. Therefore, nations enjoy unimpeded satellite overflight of other nations
through space.” This has long been the standard of operations in Space and some
historians have argued that President Eisenhower intentionally let the Soviets launch the
first satellite to orbit the Earth to set this precedent. JP 3-14 continues as it advises
commanders that “[o]perating from space provides line of sight (LOS) access to large
areas (including remote and denied access areas), which offers advantages for
communications, navigation, ISR, and meteorological and oceanographic (METOC)
information.” (pg. I-8).
JP 3-14 describes Orbital Mechanics and Space Weather to the military services;
again directing its comments more to the average service member and not the space
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professional. It shows how [s]atellite orbits must follow certain orbital parameters due to
physical laws. A satellite's orbit is chosen to best satisfy a satellite's mission. These
orbital parameters can sometimes be changed, but will deplete fuel, which can
significantly degrade the performance or lifespan of a system”. (JP 3-14, pg. I-8) With
regards to Space Weather it describes the effects of solar flares, charged particles, cosmic
rays, Van Allen radiation belts, and other natural phenomena and how they can “create
changes that can affect communications, navigation accuracy, the performance of
sensors, and cause electronic failures”. (JP 3-14, pg. 1-8).
JP 3-14 confirms in Chapter IV that DoD relies heavily on commercial satellite
communications. A commonly quoted statistic is that the military depends on
commercial satellites for 80 percent of its communications needs. This publication notes
that “[c]ommercial satellite communications are a critical part of US military operations,
and planning should include protection of these services.” (JP 3-14, pg. IV-17)
Chapter IV also shows how the military depends greatly on two other space
applications, commercial satellite imagery and GPS, or positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT), in the military lexicon. JP 3-14 emphasizes by stating that “[s]pace-based
imagery provided by commercial entities has become an important capability for civil
and military operations”. (JP 3-14, pg. IV-17) Since most commercial satellite imagery
is unclassified, it can be easily shared with coalition or host nation countries who might
not have access to more classified products. GPS, or PNT, has become ubiquitous in
everyday military and civilian life. Originally designed for military applications, GPS
quickly became a commercial staple and JP 3-14 notes that “space-based PNT
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capabilities are, by national policy, dual military-civilian use” and each would be sorely
handicapped without it (JP 3-14, pg. IV-17)
Presidential National Space Policy
Nearly every President issues a National Space Policy. It is interesting to see the
importance (or lack thereof) which some Presidents put on National Space Security and
its management, organization and administration. Figure 4 illustrates this perfectly. In
the following section I will analyze some recent Presidential Space policies and how they
have evolved over the years.
2010 National Space Policy
The National Space Policy of the United States of America was signed by President
Obama on June 28, 2010. This unclassified document is quite comprehensive and
addressed each sector of space (Civil, Commercial, and National Security Space). As a
testament to how the importance of the space medium has evolved over the decades, the
policy states that “the benefits of space [now] permeate almost every facet of our lives.”
It addresses Principles, Goals, Intersector Guidelines and Sector Guidelines for agencies
of the USG to follow. Broad, overarching statements are made in the Principles and
Goals sections. Several USG agencies, departments and individuals are addressed under
the Intersector Guidelines (Office of Science, Technology and Policy; Secretary of State;
Secretary of Defense; DNI; NASA; Secretary of Transportation; and Secretary of
Energy). No particular entity, other than the United States Trade Representative (USTR),
is addressed under the Commercial sector; no Departments of Commerce, Transportation,
or Federal Trade Commission. The NASA Director, in coordination with the Secretary
of Commerce, the Director of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
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(NOAA), Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, and the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) are specifically directed to achieve certain measures under
the Civil sector. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence are
tasked with cooperation in many areas and accomplishing the National Security Space
goals. These included such topics as maintaining Space Situational Awareness (SSA);
space systems survivability; deter, defend and defeat our adversaries if they interfere or
attack our space systems; space-based intelligence collection; and integration of foreign
and commercial space capabilities. While this latest National Space Policy is fairly
comprehensive, it fails to identify one single point of contact, other than the President,
who is responsible for ensuring that this policy is followed. There is no mention of the
National Space Council or any other senior level mechanism for achieving the goals or
guidelines in this policy. As Roger Launius and Howard McCurdy note in their book,
Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, just because a president
promulgates a particular policy statement doesn’t mean that it will be executed without
vigorous effort, focus and funding. Recent examples would include the 2004 Vision for
Space Exploration and the 1989 Space Exploration Initiative.
2006 National Space Policy
This National Space Policy was signed by President George W. Bush on August 31,
2006. It superseded NSC 49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, dated September, 14 1996
which had been signed by President Clinton. It is evident that the 2010 National Space
Policy used this policy as its foundation since the sections and the language are nearly the
same. There is about the same amount of specificity and assignment of responsibilities
between the two documents. Again though, there is no mention of the processes,
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mechanisms, or the sole individual who is responsible for ensuring accomplishment of
this policy.
National Space Policies before 2002 did not, of course, have access to the 2001 Space
Commission Report and are mainly referenced here for historical context to determine the
degree of criticality that each President afforded to the space enterprise, specifically
National Security Space. President Clinton had signed his Presidential Decision
Directive or PDD, titled National Security Council (NSC) 49 / National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) 8, National Space Policy. It is more basic and not as
detailed as its successors, but it is similar in format and focus. There are no significant
additions or deletions to the NSS sector. Additionally, this National Space Policy does
detail the guidelines for Nonproliferation, Export Controls and Technology Transfer.
President G.H.W. Bush issued National Security Directive 30, National Space Policy
Directive, on November 2, 1989. This document was originally classified as Secret and
has been heavily redacted in the unclassified, releasable version. Again, its format and
the responsibilities it assigns to the space sectors is much the same as its successors.
However, President G.H.W. Bush did elevate National Space Policy actions to the
National Space Council level; appointing Vice President Dan Quayle with the NSC
responsibilities. There are major portions of Military Space and Intelligence Space
sectors missing through redaction, but it does not appear that there were significant
changes. This policy does make specific references to the Space Shuttle as it applies to
the Civil and NSS sectors. President Reagan issued his Presidential Directive on
National Space Policy on February 11, 1988. The format and language was again much
the same, but he did emphasize that the Senior Interagency Group (SIG) Space would
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continue to coordinate the development and implementation of NSS policy. Lastly,
President Carter issued NSC-37, National Space Policy, on May 11, 1978. The portions
of this policy which dealt with NSS were again highly redacted, but he did appoint the
OSTP Director as the lead for developing the National Space Policy.
Figure 4 shows the importance that various Presidential administrations have placed
on National Security Space and the National Space Policy. It is easy to identify which
Presidents were focused on the space enterprise by analyzing this chart. There are many
crests and troughs as administrations cycle through their terms. Another important aspect
of Figure 4 is the “Historical Context – Predominant Backdrop” which runs across the
top. This timeline gives some interpretation to the other factors which may have been the
main focus for each respective administration. This analysis would seem to indicate that
the administrations which placed the right amount of emphasis and enough senior level
involvement in the space enterprise were more successful in accomplishing their goals
with respect to National Space Policy. President Obama campaigned that he would
reinvigorate the National Space Council during his administration, but there was no
mention of it in 2010 when his National Space Policy was released and there has been no
movement on this council in the intervening years. While the National Space Council
level may be too much emphasis, the OSTP/NSC/OMB staff level is not enough. The
“Goldilocks Zone” for Space Policy seems to be at the SIG level.
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Figure 4. Historical Perspective on White House Organization for Space Policy Management
Source: Space Policy in Transition by Dr. Scott Pace

Department of Defense Directives
The DoD has sought to clarify duties and assign responsibilities through a number
of Department directives over the years. Known as “DoDD” they provided very specific
directions about what each of the Services were assigned to do. Below is a list of several
significant directives which helped shape National Security Space within DoD.
DoDD 5160.32 was an important document in charting the path of how DoD
organized and managed NSS assets. Tracing its history back to 1961, it is determined
that it enabled the USAF to obtain the lion’s share of military space. Furthering the NSS
enterprise, it teamed up with the NRO thereby ensuring its continued preeminence. This
document specifically outlined the duties and responsibilities among the services. “DoD
Directive 5160.32 of 1961 severely limited the scope of U.S. Army space programs. It
prohibited the U.S. Army from developing independent reconnaissance satellites, space
launch, and space system operations. As a result of 5160.32, these missions were
assigned to the Air Force, as was with the responsibility to meet the Army's requirements.
The USAF's effort to become the lead space service was greatly aided by SecDef
McNamara's decision to centralize space system development within the Air Force
through Directive 5160.32. This Directive assigned the USAF responsibility for research,
development, test and engineering of DoD space development programs and projects, and
in turn, made the USAF the executive agent for military space development. By mid1961, the USAF was responsible for more than 90 percent of all U.S. military space
efforts.” (Boehme, 2000)
This DoDD was revised in 1970 to allow the individual services “to research and
develop satellite programs to meet their own specialized warfighting… to develop their
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own specialized satellite systems for ocean surveillance, communication, navigation,
meteorology, mapping, charting, and geodesy.” (Boehm, 2000) This was a benefit to the
Army and the Navy as they were eager to gain more access to the space enterprise in
order to facilitate their respective requirements. The Navy had continued space systems
research which eventually led to the development of the GPS system.
Currently, DoDD 5100.01, Functions of DoD and its Major Components, dated
December 21, 2010 is the document that establishes the functions and responsibilities
within the DoD, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Military Services,
Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities. The earlier version had been issued on
August 1, 2002.
It assigns “Common Military Service Functions” to each military service;
specifically to “[d]evelop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and
organize, train, equip, and provide land, naval, air, space, and cyberspace forces… that
enable joint force commanders to conduct decisive operations across the spectrum of
conflict in order to achieve the desired end state.” Therefore, the Army is primarily
responsible for combat operations on land “and such aviation, water transport, and space
and cyberspace forces as may be organic therein”, and so forth with the Navy and Marine
Corps (maritime) and the Air Force (air). Accordingly, it assigns primary responsibility
for air and space to the Air Force and directs that it [p]rovide agile combat support to
enhance the air and space campaign… [and] conduct global integrated command and
control for air and space operations.”
DoDD 3100.10, Space Policy, dated October 18, 2012, was signed by Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Ashton B. Carter. It details within the DoD what the
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responsibilities are for each Department, Military Service and COCOMs. The directive
states that DoD will protect and strengthen the “safety, sustainability, stability, and
security in space; maintain and enhance the national security advantages afforded by the
use of space; and energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.”
It details out the five space mission areas; space situational awareness, space support
activities, force enhancement, space force application and space control. It further
affirms that DoD will “serve as the launch agent for both the defense and intelligence
space sectors.” Enclosure 2 of this document gives specific direction to a number of DoD
departments and related agencies USD (P), ASD (GSA), USD (AT&L), USD (I), DIA,
NGA, NRO, NSA, and the DoD CIO. It reminds the Secretary of the Air Force that they
are the DoD EA for Space and assigns this position as the Chair for the Defense Space
Council. DoDD 3100.10 also details space-related responsibilities to the Commander of
USSTRATCOM to include SSA, space control operations, and serving as the “focal point
for space control requirements from the other Combatant Commanders… [and
coordinating the] indications, warning, and response to interference with U.S. space
systems or the use of space for non-peaceful purposes.”
DoDD 5101.02, DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Space, dated January 25, 2013
was also signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton B. Carter. It replaced an earlier
version from 2003 and continued the recognition of the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF) as the DoD EA for Space. This document notes that the DoD EA for Space
“[p]romotes unity of effort across the DoD space enterprise as the single official with
primary responsibility for achieving this outcome.” Additionally, the DoD EA for Space
is tasked with reviewing and assessing management of the Space Virtual MFP. Another
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important facet of this document is that it details the operations of the Defense Space
Council. It delineates the composition, the duties and responsibilities and its authorities.
There was an earlier memorandum dated November 22, 2011, also signed by DUSD
Carter, that initially defined the operations of the DSC and laid the foundational basis for
its mandates. DoDD 5101.02 is a watershed document provides clear direction within
DoD of how the space enterprise will operate.
2002 Unified Command Plan Reorganization
The is Unified Command Plan (UCP) reviewed periodically and there have been many
changes over the decades. But in June 2002 the DoD decided on a major reorganization
effort for the Combatant Commands (COCOM). In the aftermath of 9/11, more
importance was place on homeland security and NORTHCOM was created.
Subsequently JFCOM and USSPACECOM were disestablished and their responsibilities
merged in with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM. STRATCOM was given ever
increasing global mission. This tumultuous time was best described in a History of the
Unified Command Plan, 1946-2012, by the Joint History Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Although the revised UCP 2002 and its accompanying changes
were the most dramatic modifications to the UCP since its inception in 1946, there was
still unfinished business.” (History of the UCP, 2013). Subsequent changes in 2004,
2006, 2008, and 2011 have yielded the organization structure we have today.
The current UCP has nine COCOMs, six regional, as detailed in Figure 5, and
three functional. Figure 5 displays how the COCOMs are aligned and their Areas of
Responsibility (AOR). STRATCOM, Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) fit into this structure as the functional
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commands. The space enterprise fits under STRATCOM as Joint Functional Combatant
Command- Space (JFCC-Space).

Figure 5. Unified Command Plan – Designations of COCOMs

2011 National Security Space Strategy
This was an important document which demonstrates the cooperative efforts
between Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Jointly signed by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Director of National Intelligence James R.
Clapper, it notes that “[m]aintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is
central to our national security, but an evolving strategic environment increasingly
challenges U.S. space advantages. Space, a domain that no nation owns but on which all

51

rely, is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. These challenges,
however, also present the United States with opportunities for leadership and partnership.
Just as the United States helped promote space security in the 20th century, we will build
on this foundation to embrace the opportunities and address the challenges of this
century.” (NSSS, Jan 2011). The document addresses the Strategic Environment, the
Strategic Objectives and the Strategic Approach to provide the DoD and IC with clear,
consistent guidance in order to “implement [this Strategy] to inform future planning,
programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis guidance” as it relates to the space
enterprise. This NSSS codifies the goals and objectives from the 2010 National Space
Policy, the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and
the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy.
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta released a new Defense Strategic Guidance,
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense for 2012. The
foreword was written by President Obama who emphasized the current transitional period
of our Nation and our Armed Forces as we were concluding combat operations in the
Middle East and preparing for new challenges across the globe. SECDEF Panetta echoed
these comments by noting that the Nation “is at a strategic turning point after a decade of
war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and
leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced.” The documents
continues as it defines the ten “Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces.” Number
five is the mission to “Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space.” This paragraph
states that “[m]odern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations
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without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to
cyberspace and space. Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a
range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy assets. Accordingly, DoD will
continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in
advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in
cyberspace and space.” (Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012). Its an important distinction
that the space medium, although coupled with cyberspace, made it into the Defense
Strategic Guidance. This illustrates the importance placed on the space domain as a vital
interest of the United States.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
It is clear in the preceding chapters that the 2001 Space Commission Report
provided sound recommendations for the improvement of the National Security Space
management and organization. Some of the suggestions, as noted previously, were acted
upon and others were not. It is also evident that the nation has yet to achieve effective
management and organization of the NSS. While the Department of Defense and the
Intelligence Community have made significant strides in reorganizing for success there
are a few key points that are still missing. These steps, if enacted, will provide a more
focused, efficient and responsive force structure. Still needed is a clear, concise,
consistent and long term national space policy, reinvigoration of the National Space
Council (or at least the SIG), designate a single person (a space czar) responsible for the
national level space entity, and quite possibly to establish a separate joint space force not
under the auspices of the Air Force.
Way Ahead
I believe, as stated previously in the Defense Strategic Guidance, that we are at
the threshold of a new global environment. This nation has accomplished many iterative
steps over the last nearly sixty years in advancing along the national security space
enterprise. However, the Space medium has become such an important aspect of our
national fabric that we cannot delay any further in giving it its due attention.
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We need a consistent, coherent, concise, and long term National Space Policy. Lt
Col (at the time) Peter Hays and Dr. Karl Mueller stated in a 2001 edition of Aerospace
Power Journal for their article, Going Boldly – Where?, Aerospace Integration, the
Space Commission, and the Air Force’s Vision for Space; “Imperfect but durable vision
statements that merely get it less wrong than our potential adversaries (to use Michael
Howard’s phrase) are preferable to churning out new vision statements with every change
in senior leadership.” (Hays and Mueller, 2001). Now Dr. Hays and Col Arnold
revisited this theme ten years later in the 2011 edition of High Frontier. They stated in
their article, Getting There From Here: Realizing the Space Commission’s Vision 10
Years Later, “we reiterate that it is more important to focus on the first-order issue of
developing a robust and comprehensive vision for US spacepower than to become mired
in seemingly endless debates about the best way to organize for NSS. Our recent
missteps indicate that any road will get you there when you don’t know where you’re
going; a more effective and better funded organization will only get you lost faster in
these situations. Limited resources are always a problem, and although there is a clear
need for much investment in some areas such as space situational awareness, simply
throwing more money at the Air Force (or a new space service, for that matter) will not
resolve America’s unclear vision for NSS.” (Arnold & Hays, 2011) A durable, viable
and enduring National Space Policy vision statement is sorely needed. Reinvigorate the
National Space Council or the Senior Interagency Group to provide input, monitoring,
action and ensure execution of this vision statement. This is echoed by Col Arnold and
Dr. Hays as “the president should lead development of a National Space Strategy and
reestablish a [National Space Council] that is chaired by the National Security Advisor
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and includes the OSTP director and chair of the Council of Economic Advisors.” (Arnold
and Hays, 2011).
There have been other important government reorganizations over the years
resulting in significant advancements. One of the notable efforts was the National
Defense Act of 1947 which restructured the War Department and the Navy Department
into the Department of Defense; formed the United States Air Force and the Central
Intelligence Agency; and established the Joint Staff. Another notable reorganization was
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. It also restructured the Department of Defense;
solidifying duties and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the roles of the nine
Combatant Commands. The Space Commission Report” also sought to make sweeping
restructuring organizational changes in order to streamline the manner in which this
nation conducts space enterprises and to conserve precious and valuable space assets /
resources.
While 1957 may have been the beginning of the “space race”, the National
Defense Act of 1947 may well have been the beginning, or at least formalization, of the
close relationship between the military and the intelligence community. The National
Defense Act of 1947 established the United States Air Force as a separate service from
the United States Army and also created the Central Intelligence Agency. It was a major
reorganization of the United States government and guided its national security for many
decades.
Goldwater-Nichols for National Security Space
In considering what should be recommendations for future reorganizations or
better management processes, I considered how the Goldwater-Nichols Act changed our
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government structure. The Center for Strategic and International Studies article by
Colonel Michael Edwards, USAF, Goldwater-Nichols Act for Homeland Security, was
written for reorganizing Homeland Defense but it easily works as a valid argument for
improving our National Security Space management and organization also. “All cabinetlevel departments need to join together in a Goldwater-Nichols type reform to look at
man-made and natural threats and government responses in an integrated manner. By
creating better communication and synergistic efforts our government will be better
equipped to handle, in a cost effective manner, the outcome of a terrorist act or natural
disaster. This course of action will drive a holistic approach for the development of
capabilities that will be flexible and resilient while providing a proactive capability to
prevent some of the threats facing us today and in the future.” (Edwards, 2006). The
time is ripe for this type of national level reform in order to better streamline the NSS
management and organization.
National Security Space Management Reorganization
There are similarities in the recommendations between the 2008 Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA) Report, Leadership, Management, and Organization for
National Security Space, and those of Dr. Hays and Col Arnold in their 2011 High
Frontier article mentioned earlier. Both advocate for the creation of a dual-hatted
National Security Space Authority who would serve as the USD (Space) and the Dep
DNI for Space (See Figure 6). This position would also have Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) over space funding and the acquisition process. This is a critical
requirement since the entity which controls the funding controls the processes. Another
recommendation that has been advanced is to re-establish the USECAF and the DNRO
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into one position. While I agree that this would be ideal, I would argue that the DSC
serves this function by incorporating the IC into the DoD process.

SECDEF

DNI

National Security
Space Authority (NSSA)
Assigned as
USD(Space) and Dep DNI for Space
Joint/ Interagency Staffing

Advanced
ISR

Coordinating
Relationships

(USAF, CIA, USN, USA, USMC)

Integrating Functions:
•
Policy
Investment Strategy and Plans
•
Technical Architectures
•
Requirements
•
Milestone Decision Authority
•
Budgeting (MFP-12)
Inter-agency Programmatic Coordination
Space Infrastructure and Industrial Base
•

•
•

DIA
DISA
NGA
NSA
NASA
DARPA
Space
Missile
Defense
Agcy

NOAA

Capability Providers (NSSO)

Figure 6. Consolidate National Security Space Leadership
Source: IDA, 2008
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Council and the establishment of a National Security Space Organization. See Figure 7.
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Source: IDA 2008

Figure 7. National Security Space Organization
The 2008 IDA Report also advances the reinvigoration of the National Space

Col Arnold and Dr. Hays additionally advance the prospect of “[reestablishing] a
unified command with space as its area of responsibility (AOR)… [creating] a Space
Staff separate from the Air Staff… and control over personnel actions, including
promotion decisions.” (Arnold & Hays, Aug 2011).
In keeping with these recommendations and observations, I would submit, as Brig
Gen MacLaughlin stated earlier in High Frontier, that we have it mostly right. There are
a number of different reorganizations which may work, but I believe the iterative steps
we have taken thus far are pointing us in the right direction. The next logical steps would
be:
1. Appointment of one single entity or responsible agent to lead the Space enterprise
on behalf of the USG. No Presidents have ever appointed a “space czar”. If you conduct
a web search for space czar, then you’ll find there is no such entry. Presidents since FDR
have designated nearly eighty other positions that have been a “czar” of one form or
another, but never a space czar. A “Director of Space” may also work. This person
would be able to coordinate activities among the many different agencies. I envision this
position much like the current position of DNI. This course of action would structure the
“Space Community” like the Intel Community. The Director of National Intelligence
oversees 16 independent intelligence agencies. He does not exercise direct control over
the agencies nor does he have the hire and fire authority. However, the DNI does control
the budgetary oversight of the myriad of intelligence agencies. The President could
appoint this person under an Executive Order. This one person would have the
responsibility to coordinate all four sectors of space.
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2. In agreement with Col Arnold and Dr Hays, as noted above, I would advocate
creating a separate Space staff independent of the Air Staff. In actuality, there already
exists such an entity, the DoD EA for Space. I would advocate making this an entirely
joint staff office with representation from each of the services and not under the purview
of the Air Staff. Eventually, when a US Space Force is created, then the “Space Staff” is
already in existence.
3. I’m also in agreement with Lt Col Harter, from his article in the 2006 High
Frontier, that now is the appropriate time to make a separate Space Force. Col Arnold
and Dr. Hays advocated for a separate Space Corps within the Air Force in their High
Frontier article. Their recommendation would create an Air Force Space Corps within
the Air Force, much like the Marine Corps is part of our maritime forces and falls under
the Department of the Navy. They also note that the Army Air Corps was part of Army
before it was split off to become the US Air Force which “served as an interim step on
the path to the creation of an independent Air Force in 1947.” (Arnold and Hays, 2011). I
would argue that AFSPC has already fulfilled that interim role since its establishment in
1982 and it is the appropriate time to make the next logical step in the process. JFCCSpace has also been a good iterative step in the transition to a separate Space Corps. Lt
Col Harter probably best framed this argument in his 2006 ASPJ article in which he
stated, “While such a reorganization of space forces into a separate, independent space
force is understandably delayed due to the current global war on terrorism, it no doubt
needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. Perhaps this is precisely the right time; as
we wind down our war in Afghanistan, start laying the groundwork now to make a
separate service and maybe we can realize this goal in 5, 10, or even 15 years. Some say
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that a separate space force is not justified until there is a serious space peer competitor
that challenges US space superiority. The response to that argument is that although the
United States holds a healthy asymmetric space-power advantage today, it would be
foolish to wait for national space forces to be threatened or allow a potential “Space Pearl
Harbor” to occur when the opportunity exists now to organize space forces to prevent that
very threat. An independent space force will foster a space-force culture, reduce
competition for resources, and allow space-power theory and resulting combat capability
to develop more effectively to counter future space threats.” (Harter, 2006).
4. Re-establish USSPACECOM as a sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM.
During my interview with Mr. Richard McKinney, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air
Force for Space, he opined that bringing back USSPACECOM in some manner may be a
way to advance the NSS management and organization efforts. This construct would be
similar to the current organization of CYBERCOM. As a precedent, Cyber is the fifth
medium of military operations and is currently a major sub-unified command under
STRATCOM. It is commanded by Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, (four-star billet)
who is also triple-hatted as the Director, NSA and Chief, Central Security Service. Each
military service contributes to US Cyber Command: Army Cyber Command/Second
Army consisting of Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal
Command, Army Intelligence and Security Command, 1st Information Operations
Command, 780th Military Intelligence Brigade; Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet, Naval
Network Warfare Command, Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command, Naval
Information Operations Command; Air Forces Cyber/Twenty-Fourth Air Force, 67th
Cyberspace Operations Wing, 688th Cyberspace Operations Wing, 624th Operations
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Center, 5th Combat Communications Group; and the Marine Corps Cyberspace
Command.
By comparison, space forces currently under STRATCOM, are organized as a Joint
Functional Component Command-Space (JFCC-Space). This organization is
commanded by Lt Gen John W. Raymond, USAF (three-star billet) who is dual-hatted as
the 14th Air Force Commander. In order to put Space on an equal footing as Cyber, since
they are both doctrinally mediums of military operations, then JFCC-Space should be reestablished as USSPACECOM under STRATCOM and become a four-star billet once
again. DoD is always concerned with creating more units, infrastructure and adding
more personnel, especially in these times of budget cutbacks and personnel reductions.
This vision though could be realized without any additional growth to the force and very
little, if any, infrastructure costs. I would recommend using the four-star billet of AFSPC
Commander, Gen John E. Hyten, as the head of the new USSPACECOM. He would
have at his ready the already existing staffs of AFSPC in Colorado Springs, CO (Air
Force), SMDC-ARSTRAT in Huntsville, AL and Colorado Springs, CO (Army), Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) in San Diego, CA (Navy) and JFCCSpace at Vandenberg AFB. In the spirit of “jointness”, I would also recommend that the
new USSPACECOM not be a solely Air Force position and that it be commanded by
qualified four star general officers / admirals from all four services.
Lt Col Harter brought forth a wonderful quote from Major General William “Billy”
Mitchell in his 2006 ASPJ article. Maj Gen Mitchell, considered by many as the Father
of the Modern Air Force, advocated for a separate air service in the early 1900’s when it
was still a part of the US Army. “So long as the budget for the development of aircraft is
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prepared by the Army, Navy, or other agency of the Government, aviation will be
considered as an auxiliary and the requisite amount of money, as compared with the other
services, will be subject to the final decision of personnel whose main duty is not
aviation. The greatest deterrent to development which air forces combat in every country
is the fact that they have had to be tied up to armies and navies where senior officers,
unused to air work, were placed in the superior positions.” General William “Billy”
Mitchell US Army Air Service, 1925 (Harter, 2006) Lt Col Harter noted that if the word
“space” is substituted for the word “air” in Maj Gen Mitchell’s comments then you have
a very similar argument for making space a separate service from air. He maintains as
the Army shepherded the Air Force as it became an operationally decisive arm of the
military, much the same way that the Air Force has brought space power and operations
along. Lt Col Harter asserts that “[o]nce the Air Force became an independent service,
airpower rapidly grew into a global, strategic instrument of national power.” (Harter,
2006)
His further comments on this subject are critical to understanding and appreciating
the essentiality of creating a separate space force. “However, as airpower was
constrained during the post–World War I era, US space power was constrained during the
Cold War and morphed to airpower doctrine, policy, and theory. In spite of this restraint,
military space power has grown to be a pervasive influence on nearly every facet of
military operations. The United States holds a decisive asymmetric space-power
advantage — clearly it is too critical to be considered a subset of airpower. An
independent space-force organization would fully unleash the true potential of space
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power, allowing freedom to explore, develop, and refine space theory, doctrine, and
policy without undue influence from other service cultures.” (Harter, 2006)
As stated previously, I believe that we mostly have it right and we are mostly the way
there. I would submit that with a clear, consistent, enduring space vision from the
President, appointment of a central, senior level government official for emphasis and
focus, and finally a NSS reorganization as outlined in this research paper, that we will
continue to enjoy the benefits that we have realized from this important medium of space
for many years to come.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
I have analyzed the 2001 Space Commission Report in detail, conducted a
literature review of many supporting documents, interviewed a senior government
official, and proposed several viable courses of action to better enable management and
organization of the national security space enterprise.
Future research areas to pursue would be to interview more commission members,
senior government officials and military leaders for a broader understanding of what
directions they believe the nation should undertake to achieve better national security
space management and organization. As a testament to the criticality of enacting
reorganizations now, consider the comments from Secretary of the Air Force Deborah
Lee James. She remarked at the 2010 National Space Symposium when commenting
about the numerous changes to NSS management and organization over the years that
“these changes have reached the point where it is now time for the Air Force to review
headquarters management of the space enterprise; and to consider with our DoD and
interagency partners how we can better coordinate our work to serve the Nation’s
growing space needs.” She further affirmed later in her speech that space is a “vital
element of our national security” and that the “U.S. is increasingly reliant on space for its
economy, security, and prosperity.” (James, 2010).
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General Howell M. Estes, III (USAF-Ret), a commission member and a triplehatted commander of AFSPC, SPACECOM and NORAD commented in his 2011 High
Frontier article that, “Every year within the national security arena there are a number of
commissions, panels, boards, and so forth that provide recommendations to decision
makers. It has been my experience that most of the recommendations are considered, but
few are implemented. The Space Commission was a bit unique in this regard. Our
chairman became the secretary of defense. This clearly gave a push to the
recommendations we made. While not all were implemented, many were and had the
desired effect on NSS. Since the 2001 Space Commission there have been other reviews
of NSS, which says to me that work still needs to be done. I have heard people say
rearranging the deck chairs (organizational changes) really does not get at the root causes
of problems, and therefore, is not worth the effort. I disagree. We are dealing with a
complex issue here. There is no single set of solutions that will be acceptable to all the
parties concerned. However, it is important to keep chipping away at the problems and
make changes where we can achieve agreement. We owe that much to our fellow
taxpayers. More importantly, we owe it to our nation, which demands we do our utmost
to ensure NSS is serving the greater interests of our national defense in the protection of
all our citizens.” (Estes, 2011).
Conclusions
I concur with Gen Estes’ comments. It is important to continue to advocate for
more sweeping changes within the top levels of our government. By continuing to search
for a better national security space structure, perhaps as part of further research,
participation from “think tanks” or further government studies we can more accurately
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gauge the feasibility of this concept within our government and among other government
agencies. I believe, as Gen Estes stated, that we owe clear vision, direction and
oversight; along with a more streamlined and efficient NSS management and
organization to our fellow citizens and our nation.
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ACRONYMS

AFSC……………………………………………………..U.S. Air Force Space Command
ASD……………………………….……………………….Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD (GSA)…….……………………………….………….Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Security Affairs
AUSA…………………………...……………………………Association of the US Army
CIA…………………………..………………………………..Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM……………………….…………………………………….Combatant Command
CJCS……………...…………………………………Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DIA………………………………………………..…………Defense Intelligence Agency
DCI………………………………………………..………Director of Central Intelligence
DNI……………………………...……………………….Director of National Intelligence
DNRO………….………………………………Director, National Reconnaissance Office
DoD…………………….………………………………………….Department of Defense
DoD CIO………………………………………………....DoD Chief Information Officer
DoDD……….………………………………………….Department of Defense Directive
DSC……..…………………………………………...…………….Defense Space Council
DUSD……………….…………………………………Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
EA…………………….…………………………………………………..Executive Agent
IC………………………………………………….………………Intelligence Community
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JFCC…..………………………………………….Joint Functional Component Command
JCS…………….………………………………………………………Joint Chiefs of Staff
MDA……….....…………………………………………….Milestone Decision Authority
MFP………………………………………………………….………Major Force Program
NGA…………………………………………….National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NOAA………...…………………….. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRO……………………..………………………………..National Reconnaissance Office
NSA……………………………………………………………..National Security Agency
NSC………….………………………………………………….National Security Council
NSpC……………………………..………………………………..National Space Council
NSSA……………………..…………………………National Security Space Architecture
NSSS………………………………...…………………..National Security Space Strategy
NSTC…………………………………………..National Science and Technology Council
OMB………………………………………….……….Office of Management and Budget
OSR……..…………………………………………….Office of Strategic Reconnaissance
OSTP………………………………………….. Office of Science, Technology and Policy
PSA………………………………….……………………………Principal Staff Assistant
SECAF………………………………………………………….Secretary of the Air Force
SECDEF…………………………...…………………………………Secretary of Defense
SIG………………………………………….……………….….Senior Interagency Group
SMC…..……………………………………………… Space and Missile Systems Center
SSA…………………………………….…………………….Space Situational Awareness
USAF………………………………...……………………………………….US Air Force
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USECAF……….…………………………………………Undersecretary of the Air Force
USD...………………………………………………..…………Undersecretary of Defense
USD (AT&L)……………………....…………Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics
USD (I)…………………………......…………Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD (P)……………………....……………….……Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
USD (SII)……………………………………………………. Under Secretary of Defense
for Space, Intelligence and Information
USG………………………………………..…………………..United States Government
USSTRATCOM………………………………………...…………US Strategic Command
USSPACECOM………………………...………………...………….US Space Command
USASMDC/ARSTRAT.....................….US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Strategic Command
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